We address the collusion problem in a reputation multi-agent system where agents represent service providers, consumers, and a controller. A game structure is proposed where players are supposed rational and seek for maximum payoffs. The main issue addressed in this paper is how to maintain a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. We analyze the behavior of different players with respect to the strategies adopted by the opponents. We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant strategies.
Introduction
Game theory has become an efficient method for computation of solution concepts in multi-agent systems (MAS). The method is useful to obtain the pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium considering the environment of interacting agents. Active agents interacting in MAS are concerned about different parameters (application and frameworkdependent (Khosravifar et al. 2010) ). One of them is the public reputation that agents obtain, which reflects their global status among other agents. Game theory can be used to maintain an incentive-based collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. It could be applied to trading systems that involve a number of agents that are selected upon high reputation.
In multi-agent systems (MASs), establishing reputation is a must, and in the recent years different approaches to reputation have been proposed. Reputation is addressed by aggregating related parameters from different perspectives (Maximilien and Singh 2002) . One important issue is the agents' tendency to act maliciously to take advantage of the system's vulnerability, which can be done by colluding with other agents. There have been some efforts addressing collusion resistance in reputation frameworks Maximilien and Singh 2002) . However, some issues such as false alarms are yet to be addressed. In many existing frameworks, the malicious actions and collusion could be maintained by agents at any time (never end). A missing factor in these approaches is convergence towards a truthful setting. In this paper, the conditions that lead to this convergence are investigated using a game structure.
In this paper, we consider a network of providers and consumers, which are equipped with mechanisms capable of maximizing their payoffs. The proposed framework also contains a controller agent whose responsibility is to make the system trustful. A consumer agent is a rational service consumer that initiates requests hoping to obtain an acceptable quality of service (we assume the existence of a function calculating the QoS of the received service as a number between 0 and 1). There is a reputation mechanism that regulates the process of consumers selecting providers by ranking them using their reputation. The controller agent denoted by Cg objectively maintains a sound reputation mechanism by taking the provider and consumer actions under surveillance. As a matter of fact, the Cg applies some penalties in order to discourage the providers and consumers from colluding and acting maliciously.
The proposed framework is similar to the previously proposed models in the literature in the sense that the application of consumer-provider is already seen . The idea of a controller agent investigating the reputation system is used in (Khosravifar et al. 2009 ). The proposed framework is distinguished from existing frameworks, for example Kastidou et al. 2009) , in the fact that a continuous game involving three players (provider, consumer, and controller agent) is modelled and analyzed. In this framework, the collusion between providers and consumers is thoroughly discussed (skipped in similar works) and the role of Cg in maintaining a sound reputation mechanism is discussed in details. The results of the proposed framework could be summarized as follows: (1) by analyzing different situations, rational agents (providers and consumers) can recognize some restrictions that encourage them to choose the best response leading to their maximum expected payoffs; and (2) the game-theoretic analysis enables the reputation mechanism designer to compute a detection threshold so that if reached, the mechanism will be collusion-resistant. These results are confirmed by the conducted simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define some preliminaries of our proposed framework. We also describe the game settings between the entities of MAS in the collusion scenario which involves the provider and consumer agents. In Section 3, we provide a theoretical analysis of the reputation game (involving three agents but grouped into two players) and discuss some results regarding collusion resistant reputation mechanism based on the environment characteristics. We continue our discussions on the same direction of the theoretical analysis in the implemented environment and observe the impacts that environmental characteristics impose on agents' behaviors. Section 4 discusses related work and finally Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
This section points out the preliminaries regarding the proposed framework.
Involved Agents
In our proposed model, we consider n consumer agents u 1 , . . . u n (a typical consumer agent is denoted by u), m provider agents w 1 , . . . , w m (a typical provider agent is denoted by w), and a controller agent Cg. Each consumer agent u has a budget account in the system from which his requested services are paid and is equipped with a purchase mechanism that enables him to initiate a service request from a provider w specifying some buying parameters such as response time and price. Each provider agent w is characterized by his reputation, which affects his income in the system since the number of requests he can receive is reputation-dependant. He is also equipped with a selling mechanism that enables him to dynamically set up the selling parameters (response time and price) according to which a service is offered to the consumer agent u. The controller Cg is equipped with a supervision mechanism that enables him to investigate the truthfulness of the interactions among the involved agents and has access to the consumers' accounts and providers' reputations. Agents u and w are examples that we use in the rest of the paper. But they are generalized to a number of consumer and provider agents that keep interacting with one another during their lifetimes.
Reputation Mechanism
The typical agent u posts a feedback f reflecting the extent to which the offered service by the provider agent (say w) is satisfactory. The feedback f belongs to the interval [−1, 1], where −1, 0, +1 respectively represent complete dissatisfaction, no answer from the provider, and complete satisfaction. The accumulated feedback (posted by different consumers over time) are used to compute the reputation value of providers. There are a number of frameworks (Maximilien and Singh 2002; Vogiatzis et al. 2010 ) that address the reputation assessment problem ranging from simple mean values to more sophisticated distributions. However, the way the reputation is computed does not have impacts on our results. In fact, we are mainly interested in fraud in the feedback pool. Since choosing a service from the network of services is very selective, provider agents compete to increase their reputation (which is supposed to bring more requests from consumers). In our model, the agent Cg is responsible for investigating the feedback pool to capture malicious actions. What me mean by fraud is that a provider agent w can collude with one or many consumer agents to support him by posting faked positive feedback, which would increase w's reputation.
Consumer-Provider Strategy Profile
The consumer and provider agents follow 2 strategies: being truthful or malicious. In the truthful strategy, the provider provides the service and consumer posts the corresponding truthful feedback to the feedback pool. In the malicious strategy, the provider provides incentives ( ) to some consumers to motivate them providing continuous positive feedback even without receiving a service. Colluding with a consumer is aimed at increasing self reputation. This leads to increase provider's market share and thus obtain higher income. Other malicious strategies are possible such as decreasing competitors' reputation. However, to make the paper focused, we only consider the first possibility in this paper.
Collusion Scenario
To make the scenario simple but without losing generality, let us consider only one provider w colluding with one consumer u (the generalization to n consumers is straightforward). The collusion agreement established between w and u clarifies the number of fake positive feedback that u is going to post for w. Associated with the feedback pool is a window that represents a number, publicly known, of feedback that is accumulated in a fixed period of time, for instance an hour or a day. In this scenario, f w is the percentage of this window that represents the fake positive feedback the consumer would post. The consumer would receive a number of services from the provider. In this case, u is satisfied with the received services and rationally +1 would be the corresponding real feedback. But there are extra number of not responded requests that u is also going to post +1 for in support of w (these feedback should be 0 and posting 0 would actually decrease the reputation of the provider w). Consequently, the provider receives f w percentage increase on his positive feedback whereas he has only responded a part of that. Therefore, his reputation increases and thus, the expected number of requests increases as well (we will use ψ to denote the percentage of this increase). In this case, the malicious consumer would receive the amount of as incentive from the provider. This amount (i.e. ) should be less than the amount gained by the provider (λ w ψβ, where λ w represents the mean request number in the fixed period of time relative to the window, and β denotes the price charged by w for offering the service) in the case of adopting the collusion strategy. Therefore, the provider always predicts the expected income before motivating a consumer to adopt the collusion.
Controller-Provider/Consumer Connection
The controller agent Cg continuously investigates the feedback pool and his detection strategy is based on applying some dynamically changing thresholds (this aspect is detailed in Section). Associated with the feedback pool is a fixed size window that Cg considers in his investigation. The parameter w c represents the percentage of this fixed size window that Cg is going to analyze. The value w c would differ over time and the provider and consumer agents need to estimate or predict it when deciding about their strategies of acting truthfully or maliciously. The detection probability reflects the controller agent's accuracy in investigating the feedback pool. This probability could be increased over time when Cg applies some learning mechanisms to use information from past detections in the current investigation. The accuracy of the controller agent would evolve over time and reflects the extent to which the controller agent is confident on analyzing the data. This value is by default a high value which prevents a part of malicious providers to initiate the malicious action. However, since the detection procedure does not affect the results of this paper, we only focus on the role of the parameter w c . After deciding to penalize the collusion, Cg notifies both the provider and consumer by sending them a report revealing the parameters regarding the penalty process such as the considered window parameter w c and the percentage df c of detected fake feedback (explained in the following). The rationality behind this information revealing is the fact that the rational provider would learn the progress of the controller agent and that would influence to some certain extent the tendency of acting maliciously.
Four possibilities can be analyzed: 1. Cg detects the actual collusion and gets +π as payoff. This payoff is assumed as incentive to increase self efficiency. The default goal of the controller is to maximize the efficiency. This value does not bring any benefit for the controller, but in general shows the efficiency of the proposed framework. Therefore, the π payoff type is not compared with the payoff associated to the provider and consumer agents. We consider the parameter D c as the accuracy of detection. In analyzing the feedback pool within the window percentage w c , Cg catches a percentage of this w c , denoted by df c , as the fake feedback and the assigned penalty dfc wc P n to both the provider and consumer is proportional to the detected fake feedback, where the public parameter P n represents a maximum penalty assigned by Cg. When it affects the consumer, the penalty is applied to his budget (money is taken from his budget account in the system), and when it affects the provider, the penalty concerns his reputation, which then affects his income since the number of received requests will decrease. Moreover, the provider looses some money since the paid balance regarding the fake reputation is being reduced. In this case, the report sent to both the provider and consumer reveals df c and w c . It is important to note that the maximum penalty P n cannot be increased without any condition to avoid high number of false detections that would cause low efficiency of the framework. 2. Cg ignores the actual collusion and gets −π as payoff. This is the worst case because the malicious provider increases his reputation and the malicious consumer receives the inventive of . This case, called false positive, decreases Cg's accuracy in detection. 3. Cg detects the truthful action as collusion and gets −π as payoff. This is also harmful in the sense that the truthful provider is losing his reputation and the truthful consumer is losing money because of Cg's mistake. This is the case of false negative that negatively affects the Cg's accuracy. 4. Cg ignores the truthful actions and gets +π as payoff. Socially speaking, this corresponds to the best situation, and the objective is to encourage all the players to converge towards such a situation.
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
In our framework, which we model as a game, 3 players are involved. The first one is the controller agent Cg, which penalizes or ignores the actions performed by the opponents (i.e. provider and consumer agents). Because our objective is to analyze collusion, we consider providers and consumers as one group since collusion takes place only when they cooperate. When one of them refuses to collude, the other has no choice but to play truthfully. In this perspective, which player initiates the collusion is not important. A provider can collude with one or many consumers and visaversa. To simplify the game without losing generality, we consider one-to-one relations and the generalization is simply by summing the different payoffs. Thus we have a game of 3 players forming 2 groups, each player has his own payoff.
There are important details in this game. It is worthy to note that the stage game is the example of a typical moment considering three particular players, which is generalized to a repeated game between all interacting agents. Information obtained from each stage game is used in the rest of agent's involved games. In fact, rational agents consider information obtained in their history interactions for their further decisions. A part of the obtained information is not correct which the agent is not aware of this fact. The discussion on the learning mechanism used by the rational agents is out of scope of this paper and for simplicity, we implement only the obtained data of the history in the implemented environment. In this framework, we focus on identifying the optimum status where the collusion is discouraged at best. To have a better analysis on the payoffs of different players, we consider the situation where the provider and consumer act truthfully and the controller agent ignores the reaction as the ideal case. Therefore, in all the payoffs analysis in the rest of this section, we consider each payoff as the difference of the expected outcome of the chosen case with the ideal case. The expected gain or loss are computed using the variables that have been obtained in the past reports, such as the feedback window parameter w c and the detected fake feedback df c . If there is no past report on collusion, we assume the existence of default values that the provider (who has never been penalized) would use to analyze the expected payoff of each case.
If the collusion is detected, the controller agent penalizes the malicious provider and consumer, which would cause dfc wc P n λ w β money loss for the provider and dfc wc P n money loss for the consumer. Therefore, the payoff of the provider would be − dfc wc P n λ w β and of the consumer would be − dfc wc P n for the case where the collusion was actually made, and − dfc wc P n λ w β and − dfc wc P n for the case where the controller has falsely considered the truth action as collusion. In this case, df c is considered by the provider as the percentage of falsely detected rightful feedback. These values are previously reported by the controller agent in the penalty report. In case the collusion is ignored, the expected payoff for the provider would be the gained fee over the extra requests minus the incentive given to the consumer λ w ψβ− (recall that λ w , ψ, β respectively represent the mean request sent to w, reputation increase amount as a result of collusion, and service fee charged by the provider). This case would bring + for the consumer. Finally the case where the provider and consumer act truthfully, they both expect 0, which corresponds to the default case.
Analysis of the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) Table 1 , the group 1 is Cg and the group 2 is formed by provider w and consumer u. In pure strategy Nash equilibrium, w and u would consider to collude when the obtained payoff is more than the one obtained in the case of acting truthfully. In the case where Cg ignores the collusion, obviously this collusion brings more payoff (λ w ψβ − > 0 for w and > 0 for u). However, if Cg penalizes and if the obtained payoff is more in the collusion case, the group 2 would choose the collusion as the dominant strategy. Proposition 1 In the repeated game of the stage game described above, if the falsely detected rightful feedback df c (reported by Cg) is more than the correctly detected fake feedback df c , the provider and consumer would choose the collusion as the dominant strategy. Proof. In this repeated game, the payoffs are the summation of stage game payoffs, so since
both w and u will always choose to collude whatever the strategy of Cg.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Corollary 1 In the repeated game of the stage game described above, if the falsely detected rightful feedback df c is more than the correctly detected fake feedback df c , penalizing the collusion is PSNE. If df c ≥ df c , then the obtained payoffs of the provider and consumer are both more compared to the case of acting truthful. This is due to the fact that when the controller agent is penalizing, the provider and consumer agents loose less when they choose collusion. Meanwhile when the controller agent is ignoring the action, these agents tend to collude as they gain more payoff. To this end, collusion would be the player 2's dominant strategy, and thus, penalizing the collusion would be the pure Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 shows two simulation results confirming Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. The left graph illustrates successful detection (reflected by df c ) versus failure detection (reflected by df c ) of a controller agent in a network containing 1000 consumer agents and 200 provider agents. The right graph plots the number of collusion versus the time (number of runs of the simulation), which reflects the overall tendency to act maliciously. In this graph, we observe that the number of collusion increases with df c − df c . The objective in this experiment is to capture the best moment when the least collusion is observed.
In this game, staying in PSNE is, socially speaking, a harmful situation for all the players. Continuing on PSNE, both groups would lose their performances. In fact, the PSNE is achieved due to temporary analysis that players do aiming to maximize their payoffs without considering probabilities of detection. Therefore, we need to consider the case where the payoffs of the players in group 2 are subject to the accuracy of Cg and his detection probability. To analyze the details of this case, we need to consider the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Analysis of the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE)
In the mixed strategy, we need to consider two probability distributions on the strategy profiles of the two groups of players (Cg and w & u). Let p be the probability of collusion, which is maintained by the provider and consumer. Therefore, 1 − p is the probability of acting truthfully. The probability of collusion depends on many factors in the game. In fact, w and u would consider the Cg's accuracy of detection, window size, and expected payoffs before performing any action. Let q be the probability of Cg penalizing the malicious action and therefore, 1 − q is the probability of ignoring the action. This probability should satisfy two properties: (1) it increases with the Cg's detection accuracy D c , which evolves over time; and (2) it also increases with the quality of choosing w c , the portion of the fixed size window that Cg is going to analyze. Equation 1 gives a definition of this probability that satisfies these properties. In this equation, f w is the actual percentage of the fake feedback in the feedback pool. Notice that q ∈ [0, 1] since 0 ≤ D c , |w c − f w | ≤ 1. If the detection is completely wrong, then |w c − f w | = 1, and if it is completely correct, then |w c − f w | = 0, which means Cg is investigating a portion of feedback from the feedback pool where all of them are fake.
We define Cg.pro = (q, 1 − q) as the probability distribution of the Cg's strategy profile and wu.pro = (p, 1 − p) as the probability distribution of the strategy profile of group 2 players w and u. In the mixed strategy case, all the players need to estimate their expected payoffs with respect to their chosen strategies against the other player's probability distribution. Let E w (C, Cg.pro) (resp. E w (T, Cg.pro)) be the expected payoff of the provider choosing to collude (resp. to act truthfully) against the probability distribution of the controller agent. In the same way we define E u (C, Cg.pro), E u (T, Cg.pro), E Cg (P, wu.pro) (P for penalizing) and E Cg (I, wu.pro) (I for ignoring). We obtain the expected values as follows:
Best Response Analysis
All the players in this mixed strategy game aim at maximizing their payoffs. Therefore, for all their adopted strategies, we need to consider the best responses and discard the other strategies. For instance, the provider, who is seeking for maximizing his payoff by choosing a specific strategy, would discard any strategy in which his expected payoff is less than any other strategy. Since each player in each stage game chooses between only two strategies, and since any of these strategies could be the best response in a particular situation, we analyze the case where the expected payoffs are equal. By so doing, we can compute a threshold, which is used to identify which strategy is dominant. If these expected payoffs are not equal, that means one strategy would lead to a higher payoff and therefore, the player would select that strategy as dominant. In this case, the mixed strategy probabilities would be (1,0) or (0,1), which is back to the pure strategy case. The best response analysis in our mixed strategy game would enable the provider w and consumer u to obtain a probability threshold (µ) for their chosen strategy. Once the threshold is obtained, w and u would estimate the probability of the action to be chosen by Cg, and by comparing this probability with the threshold, they choose the best strategy that maximizes their payoffs. In the repeated mixed strategy game, w and u estimate the probability (denoted by q w ) that Cg penalizes their action based on previous detections. This probability should satisfy the same properties as for Equation1 and is computed in Equation 5. In this Equation, the accuracy of Cg is public, but the window parameter w c is considered as the window parameter that is reported to w and u in the most recent penalty report. The parameter f w is also known to the provider and consumer. This probability could be compared against the obtained threshold µ by w and u to maximize their expected payoffs.
Theorem 1 In the mixed strategy repeated game, there is a threshold µ such that if q w > µ, acting truthfully is the dominant strategy for group 2. Otherwise, colluding is the dominant strategy.
Proof. We prove that the theorem holds for each stage game, so the repeated case follows. To find the dominant strategy for each stage game, we need to consider the case where the payoffs of the different strategies are the same. We have:
, so the first part of the theorem follows, and the second part is straightforward. The threshold µ is as follows:
Corollary 2 that follows directly from Theorem 1 gives the the condition under which the MSNE is obtained.
Corollary 2 If the estimated probability of penalizing q w exceeds the obtained threshold µ, then acting truthfully by w and u and being ignored by Cg is a MSNE.
Proof. By exceeding this threshold, the provider and consumer would choose to act truthful as their dominant strategies. Therefore, the controller agent would find better payoff by ignoring this action.
Theorem 2 A collusion-resistant reputation mechanism is achieved when the controller agent maximizes the value of Proof. From Theorem 1, we deduce that since q w ∈ [0, 1], if µ ≥ 1, then collusion would be the dominant strategy for the provider and consumer. From Equation 6 and the proof of Theorem 1, µ ≥ 1 occurs when df c ≥ df c . Therefore, to have a collusion-resistant mechanism, Cg would aim at minimizing the threshold µ used by the opponents since the estimated probability of penalizing is compared to this threshold. According to Equation 6, to minimize µ in both cases, Cg has to maximize the value at the denominator ( dfc−dfc wc P n ) as all the other factors are out of Cg's control.
In the repeated game, Cg has to consider the best window factor w c that corresponds to the fake feedback submitted to the feedback pool. The value of w c could be learned by Cg over time (while the detection accuracy D c also increases over time). However, finding the the best w c is not guaranteed since there is always a risk of different fake feedback percentage maintained by the provider and consumer as a result of collusion agreement. Therefore, there is always a risk of false negative in penalizing the provider and consumer.
This reflects the fact that the accuracy of the controller agent in penalizing the collusion has a crucial impact on the analysis that provider and the consumer maintain to adopt their strategies. If the window parameter w c is chosen with respect to some learning mechanism that maximizes dfc−dfc wc P n , the repeated game would obtain the truthful action followed by ignore of the controller agent as a situation that leads to a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism.
Empirical Observations
The learning process of the parameter w c is skipped in this paper; however, we have analyzed the impact imposed by changing this variable in our empirical analysis. We have implemented an environment holding the explained characteristics of the rational agents. We ran a simulation consisting of 100 runs, which reflect 100 (simulated) days. We linked the fixed window value to the total feedback accumulated in each run. Therefore, the parameters w c , f w , and df c are all percentages of this fixed window. We ran the simulation with 4 different mean window parameters w c (in columns a, b, c, and d of Figure 2 ) and observed 4 different results: (1) the controller agent's probability of detection evolution; (2) the provider and consumer agents' probability of collusion evolving over simulation runs; (3) the controller agent's accuracy of detection; and (4) the number of successful collusion that leads to positive payoff for the colluding agents.
As shown in Figure 2 , 4 different mean window parameters w c reflect different results. Overall, in these simulations, we obtain better results when the mean w c (as the percentage of the public window) is equal to 40% and 60%. The probability of detection evolves better in these cases compared to the ones where the mean w c is equal to 20% or 80%. The reason behind this is the fact that Cg would generate more false positives, which means penalizing the truthful action by mistakes when the mean w c is equal to 20% and more false negatives, which means ignoring the collusion by mistake since the window of investigation is considered too general when it is equal to 80%. To this end, there would be less number of successful detections that Cg can use in his further investigations. The probability of collusion p is decreasing in all the simulations with slightly different slopes. It is obvious that the collusion would never get to 0 as there are always risks of obtaining payoffs by colluding. This risk is totally related to the accuracy of the controller agent together with the probability of penalizing q w . Cg's accuracy in detection is also improved over runs as the histories of previous detections are used in his further investigation process. However, the investigation procedure is linked to the window parameter that the controller considers and thus, only the reports would not enable the controller agent to detect all the collusion. Number of successful collusion is also decreasing in all the simulations, but with different slopes. The successful collusion is considered as the one that is ignored by the controller agent.
Related Work
We consider two groups of frameworks related to our proposed model. The first group is about approaches that have been proposed for reputation assessment in MAS. Maximilien and Singh (2002) provided a complete overview regarding the parameters required to evaluate an agent's reputation. Vogiatzis et al. (2010) proposed a probabilistic model for computing the trust and reputation of rational agents in MAS. They proposed a set of assumptions that enable recognizing the agents that change their behavior to estimate their rates of change. Recently, Chapman et al. (2011) developed a unified analytical framework for distributed agents investigating the best response with respect to sequential optimization problems, which consist of state evaluation, decision rule, and adjustment schedule procedures. Doing so, agents analyze the best response, which leads to their maximum payoff.
The second group are approaches proposed to develop sound reputation mechanisms, where entities are encouraged to act truthfully Khosravifar et al. 2010; Kastidou et al. 2009 ). Khosravifar et al. (2010) developed a game-theoretic approach categorized in one-shot and repeated games to emphasize the learning mechanism used by the agents, which leads them favor truth telling. Kastidou et al. (2009) developed a framework representing safe information exchange regarding reputation assessment and agents are motivated to honestly report reputation information. All these approaches aim at maintaining a sound reputation mechanism according to aggregation frameworks similar to the ones proposed in the first group. However, these frameworks consider scenarios where only a part of the network (either the provider or consumer) play important role, which reflect partial collusion, i.e. only between agents of the same type. We believe that in dynamic MAS, a sound reputation system should consider the benefits of all the players.
The closest model to our work is the collusion-resistant reputation mechanism proposed in in which the authors investigate incentive-compatible payment mechanisms. Malicious agents' behaviors are analyzed in different scenarios to maintain an automated mechanism design that yields the best reputation assessment in the environment. The proposed mechanism is limited in the sense that it is based on a linear optimization setting that do not perform well in specific situations like when false alarms are generated through the reputation mechanism. In general, the reputation mechanism is assumed to function correctly, which makes lying a Nash equilibrium at some point. In our paper, we investigate the collusion and address the collusion-resistant setting under the assumption that the controller agent is also making mistakes. This overall encourages the provider and consumer agents to analyze the characteristics of the controller through the collusion reports sent to them.
Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is the proposition of a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism applicable to multi agent settings. The reputation mechanism is supervised by a controller agent that reveals the reputation value of provider agents to the consumers. The proposed approach investigates the settings under which the truth action is the Nash equilibrium. In the game-theoretic analysis, rational agents compute their expected payoff and according to the available information from past events in the game, they decide about their further actions. The objective of the controller agent is to update the settings such that the truth action yields the maximum gain for the provider and consumer agents. Our model is distinguished from related work in the sense that a game-theoretic (followed by empirical) analysis considering all the agents that are involved in the reputation mechanism is provided together with its aggregation process. Moreover, false alarms generated by the controller agent are also considered by the providers and consumers in their strategies and being investigated in experiments.
Our plan for future work is to integrate optimization techniques to our game and investigate in details the best value for w c , which potentially impacts the expected payoffs computed by the provider and consumer agents. We also need to analyze in depth the scenario where some providers can collude to destroy the reputation of others by causing false alarms generated by the controller.
